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Abstract 
 
This thesis attempts to answer the question why there was a breakdown in 
talks between India and the USA over the issue Special Safeguard Mechanism 
(SSM), at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva in July 2008. This is done 
through Robert Putnam’s two-level game framework, which is applied to the 
interplay between India’s negotiator and India’s domestic politics.   
The thesis concludes that the underdeveloped Indian agriulture and the 
poverty of the farmers, together with the persistence of developed countries’ 
agricultural subsidies, made further Indian concessions on the mentioned issue 
impossible. This suggests that the developed world misjudged Indian resolve in 
the negotiations and has paid too little attention to the situation of Indian farmers. 
Towards the end it is argued that the developed countries must adress Indian 
concerns and phase out their agricultural subsidies if a future multilateral free 
trade agreement is to be reached.  
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1 Introduction  
The Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations (DDR) 
was started in 2001 with the Doha Declaration as its frame work. Its 
predecessor, the Uruguay Round (UR), which culminated in the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, had left 
some developing countries worse off. They agreed to a new round of trade 
talks only on the condition that development was the centrepiece of the 
negotiations, hence its middle name. Especially India was reluctant to start a 
new round (Gallagher 2008:62).  
The overdue negotiations broke down after 9 days of negotiations at the 
Ministerial Conference in Geneva July of 2008, and has not been resumed 
since (Spero & Hart 2008:283)1. Agricultural issues turned out to be a 
stumbling block. A considerable amount of the subsequent analysis of the 
breakdown has focused on the specific issue called Special Safeguard 
Mechanism (SSM), which would allow developing countries to temporarily 
raise their import tariffs if there is a flood in their imports of agricultural 
products. Particularly, India and the USA could not agree as India wanted to 
set the SSM import trigger rate low and the U.S. wanted to set it high 
(Blustein 2008) (Spero & Hart 2008:283) (Economist 2008).  
The SSM actually stems from the 1995 Marrakesh Agreement, which 
also established the WTO and according to which it is acceptable with 
safeguards if they are temporary or applied when countries experience 
severe market disruptions from increased imports (Frieden & Lake 
2000:300). This is defined in the Agreement on Safeguards, included in the 
Marrakesh Agreement (Spero & Hart 208:106). The lastest version of SSM, 
included in the draft before the Geneva Ministerial, was originally proposed 
                                                                                                                                         
 
1 Instead, countries have turned their attention to regional and bilateral trade talks, something which have 
been lamented due to their trade-distoring nature, not least in the context of the current economic crisis 
(Krugman & Obstfeld 2008:239ff).  
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by the G-33 of developing countries who coordinates on trade and economic 
issues (among them India)2.  
This thesis is about the reasons for the inability to reach an agreement on 
that issue. It will be argued that the domestic situation and politics in India 
put Indian negotiators under restraints that simply didn´t allow for much 
maneuvering space.  
1.1 Methodology 
1.1.1 Question of investigation and purpose 
 
This is a hermeneutic, qualitative case study with primarily an idiographic 
ambition. Its ontological and epistemological foundations are realistic and 
objectivistic, respectively. The study centers around one question of investigation: 
 
Why could the Indian government not agree with the USA on the Special 
Safeguard Mechanism issue at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva in 
July 2008?  
 
The purpose is to provide a base for a discussion about what can be done to 
avoid a breakdown the next time around. In this study, the negotiations have been 
boiled down to stand between the reductions of developing countries’ import 
tariffs and developed countries’ subsidies, both of agricultural products (see 
Coughlin, Chrystal & Wood 2000:306f). This simplification has the purpose of 
making the analysis of such a wide-ranging negotiation as the DDR manageable. 
Furthermore, the question encompasses three other main delimitations: the focus 
on the Ministerial Conference in Geneva in July of 2008, the focus on the position 
                                                                                                                                         
 
2 The proposal had been criticized by exporting countries, see http://ictsd.net/i/publications/12616/ 
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of India and the focus on the particular issue of the set level for the Special 
Safeguard Mecanism.  
1.1.2 Theory and hypothesis 
The high number of member countries in the World Trade Organisation WTO 
(153), the most-favoured-nation principle (MFN) and the fact that most 
agreements in the WTO are arrived at by consensus might seem as sufficient 
explanations of why the negotiations in Geneva 2008 broke down (Frieden & 
Lake 2000:300) (Ladefoged Mortensen 2006:173f) (WTO website3). However, 
this institutional perspective is perhaps not best one because, despite these 
institutional conditions, convergence was actually reached on 18 of 20 issues in 
the negotiations (Economist 2008). As mentioned, reliable sources suggest that it 
was the disagreement over the design of the SSM, particularly between India and 
the USA, that proved to be a critical (Blustein 2008). I have therefore identified 
the theoretical framework provided in the 1988 Robert Putnam article Diplomacy 
and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games as the appropriate 
operative theory to base my answers to the question of investigation4.  
In accordance with this theory, my hypothesis is that the situation and 
influence of Indian farmers was an important reason for the fact that Indian and 
U.S. couldn’t agree5. What is important is where India stood relative to the USA, 
rather than what Indian demands were in absolute terms (since the positions of the 
countries in relative, and not absolute terms, decide the outcome of negotiations). 
The USA was chosen as a reference point ahead of other developed countries 
since reports have singled out the disagreement between India and USA.  
1.1.3 Thesis outline 
                                                                                                                                         
 
3 WTO website: www.wto.org 
4 In the terminology of Esaiasson et al. it is a theory consumptive study (Esaiasson et al. 2007:42) 
5 With this hypothesis, I do not disregard of other factors, such as developed countries’ agricultural 
subsidies.   
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After presenting the theory in the following chapter, I will provide an 
empirical background of the negotiations that took place in Geneva in July 2008. 
This will consist of two parts: (1) a summary of the most important events and 
proceedings during the negotiations, supported by extracts from statements made 
by the Indian chief negotiator during the Ministerial Conference. (2) An empirical 
survey of the general situation and domestic politics in India with special respect 
to agriculture, coupled with a specific example of the influence of particularly one 
Indian interest group. This material has been chosen in accordance with the 
deductive approach that it was primarily the domestic politics in India that 
determined the governments’ position in the negotiations, which in extension also 
had a significant effect on the outcome. The empirical background will make out 
the grounds for the subsequent analysis, where I will apply the theory on the 
specific case. This separation has been done in order to differentiate empirics from 
analysis. To answer the question of investigation, both a horizontal (between the 
Indian government and other governments) as well as a vertical (between the 
Indian government and Indian domestic politics) analysis are needed. The 
question of investigation is answered in chapter 5, together with some final 
reflections about how a future agreement could be reached.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 The two-level game  
 
Basically, international negotiations is ”conceived as a two-level game” 
between the diplomacy and the domestic politics (Putnam 1988:434). Putnam 
conceptually categorizes these as two levels: Level I is the chief negotiatior and 
his team which acts on behalf of the government. Level II is the the domestic 
politics restraints that are put on the government´s agency. For example, it can be 
various interest groups that try to impose their will and exert political pressure on 
the parliament and government (Putnam 1988:432 and 436) (see also Spero & 
Hart 2008:72). In a democracy like India, such political pressure is more severe 
than in an authoritarian state.   
At Level 1, bargaining between negotiators might or might not lead to a 
tentative agreement. At Level II, there are negotiations of what the governments’ 
position should be and of whether or not to ratify the agreement. The fundamental 
reason for the two-level game is that any Level I negotiation is subject to Level II 
influence. Thus an important aspect of the theory becomes the win-set of the 
Level II constituency, which is ”the set of all possible Level 1 agreements that 
would ´win´- that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents...” 
(Putnam 1988:437). In other words, the win-set are the contours of Level II (Ibíd). 
The underlying reasons that Level I must relate to Level II win-sets is of course 
that in the case of an unpopular agreement being reached, it might not be ratified 
or interest groups might mobilize campaigns against the incumbent and cause 
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them to lose political support6. Therefore, the government must consider the 
domestic politics when entering a negotiation. As is evident, all actors are 
assumed rational in the theory.  
Certain caracteristics are important to keep in mind regarding the winset: 
larger Level II win-sets make Level 1 agreement more likely (ceteris paribus) and 
the relative size of the respective Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of 
joint gains from the international bargain. The larger the perceived win-set of a 
negotiator, the more he can be ”pushed around” by other Level 1 negotiators. On 
the other hand, a narrow win-set can be an advantage: it can be used to argue that 
further concessions are impossible: ”I´d like to accept your proposal, but I could 
never get it accepted at home” (Putnam 1988:437-441).  
 
An important part of the theory is why defection occurs. Putnam distinguishes 
between voluntary and involuntary defection, with the former being a defection by 
Level I and the latter being a defection by Level II. Other reasons for defection 
might be that the pace in the negotiations are slowed down due to their complexity 
or that the alternative cost of of an agreement is too low (see Berridge 2005:56ff). 
A figure might help to understand the theory and why defection occurs visually:  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 Xm                           Ym 
                     Y1               Y2         X1               Y3 
 
Here, there is a zero-sum game between X and Y. Xm and Ym represent the maximum 
outcomes for X and Y respectively, while X1 and Y1 represent the minimal outcomes that could be 
ratified. (Replica of Putnam 1988:441).  
2.1.1 The three determinants of the win-set 
                                                                                                                                         
 
6 If Level I doesn’t relate to Level II, the government might not be reelected. This is a derivative from 
Rational Choice theory. Actor rationality is assumed in this thesis (see Downs 1957).  
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The win-set is determined by three principal factors (Putnam 1988:442ff): 
- Level II preferences and coalitions 
- Level II institutions 
- Level I negotiators’ strategies 
 
The first factor is perhaps the most intuitive: the preferences and coalitions 
among Level II constituents affect the size of the win-set. According to Putnam, 
Level II constituents relate to the cost of  ”no-agreement”, which is the status quo 
or, in some cases, a worsening of the situation. The lower the cost of ”no-
agreement”, the smaller the win-set and vice versa (1988:442). Another thing that 
can be said is that countries that are dependent on international trade generally 
have larger win-sets than isolated and self-sufficient economies (compare to 
Rogowski 2000:318ff). Different groups at Level II are likely to exert pressure on 
Level I negotiators to get such a good deal as possible for themselves (for 
example, farmers are likely to want subsidies and import tariffs) (see Alt & 
Gilligan 200:328).  
The government and the chief negotiatior are thus faced with tradeoffs of 
choosing which interest groups to appease and which to neglect. Here, the aspect 
of issue linkage can be introduced. Figure 2 below (showing political indifference 
curves with the ones furthest out yielding most utility) represents two countries, A 
and B in a two-issue negotiation. Let’s apply this to a hypothetical example: 
country A, with high agricultural import tariffs and country B, with heavy 
agricultural subsidies. Suppose Level II in country A might not be so keen on to 
lower their import tariffs. At the same time, Level II in country B might not be 
willing to further cut their production and export subsidies. At this point neither is 
willing to converge on a deal. If however, according to international economic 
theory (see Krugman & Obstfeld 2008), someone realises that there are mutual 
gains to be made from further liberalization and free trade, there will be a 
temptation to reach such an deal (see Ericson 2005:51). Maybe B will then make 
an offer of further cutting their subsidies to a level were the win-sets of the two 
countries intersect. A large enough cut might prompt A to lower their import 
tariffs, expanding the utility of both countries. The agreement is represented by 
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the overlap of the indifference curves in Figure II: Putnam’s second theoretical 
figure (Putnam 1988:447) which shows political indifference curves for two-issue 
negotiations: 
 
Figure 2 
            A 
 
 
 
  
 
                 B1 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
      B 
                                
Here, two issues are linked to each other. The only way to reach an agreement is to push for 
concessions on both issues towards the minimal outcomes that could be ratified. The difference 
between the two figures is first and foremost that the second one is for application on a two-issue 
negotiation, whereas the first one only shows preferences for one issue. (Near-replica of Putnam 
1988:447). 
 
The second factor that determine the win-set are the political institutions at 
Level II. Intuitively, the greater the majority of legislative delegates required for 
ratification, the smaller the win-set. Domestic political institutions carry with 
them implications that might appear somewhat paradoxical: diplomats 
representing a dictatorship have limited posibilities to refer to domestic political 
restraints since the agenda is solely set by the government without any other 
consideration (remember: ”I’d like to accept your proposal, but…” above). 
Conversely, diplomats representing and acting on behalf of a pluralistic 
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democracy have, in this respect at least, an advantage, as they can blame 
homeland restraints for their inflexible stance. In other words, a narrow win-set 
and the fear of involuntary defection become a diplomatic asset (Putnam 
1988:459).  
The third factor that influence the size of the win-set are the strategies of the 
Level I negotiators. Here the two-level game framework can be deduced to 
Principal Agent Theory. As Jönsson & Hall points out, diplomats are agents who 
act on behalf of their principals (Jönsson & Hall 2005). Since it is not possible for 
the principals to always be pefectly up-to-date on an issue, there is room for some 
autonomy fo the agent. If the principal tries to control the agent too hard there is a 
risk that an agreement will not be reached (since it doesn’t allow for flexibility) or 
that a bad agreement is reached (since the original instructions were too tightly 
given on old circumstances). On the other hand, if the agent is given more 
flexibility, the principal runs the risk of ending up with an agreement that includes 
too many concessions and that might not correspond to the wishes and that will 
turn out to be politically costly in the next election.  
The chief negotiator relates to the size of the other side’s win-set (which they 
try to maximize) and their own (whoose size is a two-edged sword: the bigger it is 
the more likely is a concluded agreement but at the same time it weakens the 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the other negotiator) (Putnam 1988:450). According 
to Putnam, the chief negotiators’ motives include enhancing his/her standing in 
the Level II game by increasing political resources, shifting the balance of power 
at Level II in favor of domestic politicies that he/she prefers and to pursue his/her 
own perception of national interest in the international context (1988:457). These 
three motives are consistent with the fact that negotiations are bargaining 
situations, in which there are both cooperative and conflictual elements, at the 
same time that the decisions often are intertwined and interdependent (see Jönsson 
& Hall 2005:82). Then, if the negotiators perceive that the negotiations and deal at 
hand are cooperative (win-win), an agreement should be more likely than if they 
perceive the negotiations as a competetive (win-lose). The dynamics of 
international negotiations and its decisions of course become even more complex 
and interdependent when they are multilateral, as in the case of the DDR (see 
Berridge 2005:56 and 151ff).  
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2.1.2 Uncertainty and ”kinky” win-sets 
 
Relaxing the assumption of perfect information about the size of the win-set 
has various implications for the theory. As already mentioned, negotiators have an 
incentive to understate their own win-set and if the opposite side lacks 
information, this can be exploited7. Uncertainty regarding the other party’s win-
set, on the other hand, increases one’s concern of involuntary defection. Deals can 
only be struck if each negotiator is convinced that the proposed deal lies within 
his opposite number’s win-set for ratification. Therefore, uncertainty about a win-
set can be both good and bad.  
Also, a utility-maximizing negotiator must convince his opposite number that 
his own win-set is ”kinky”, which means that the proposed deal is certain to be 
ratified, but that a slightly more favorable deal to the opponent is unlikely to be 
ratified (Putnam 1988:453). In other words, that all possiblities of concessions are 
exhausted. At the same time, negotiators try to expand each others’ win-sets by 
altering perceptions of the benefits of the proposed agreement and the costs of 
”no-agreement” (what Putnam calls reverberation). The negotiator might also try 
to alter the others’ perceptions of the costs of no-agreement and the benefits of 
proposed agreements (what Putnam calls restructuring, see 1988:454f).  
Now follows an overview of the negotiations that took place in Geneva in 
2008. These will therafter be analysed with respect to the theoretical framework. 
Fundamentally, what I will do is apply Robert Putnams theory on this specific 
case and identify Indias Level II win-set, which I will argue were irreconcilable 
with the U.S. Level II win-set.  
                                                                                                                                         
 
7 For example, under the right circumstances, the negotiator can falsely claim to oppose a proposal on one 
issue. When the other party tries to persuade him/her, he can concede to agree under the condition that 
the other party makes concessions on another issue. By using the political capital created by the (false) 
concession as leverage, the negotiator has managed to obtain two deals that he/she wanted, making it 
seem like he/she only got one. 
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3 Empirical background 
3.1 Economical background 
Free trade actually has the potential to be the solution to poverty in 
developing countries. One of its many defenders is nobel prize winner Paul 
Krugman. Although recently appearing somewhat disillusioned as to its 
results8, free trade is still generally thought of as a major backbone in 
development policy. According to Kevin Gallagher, although developing 
countries as a whole were made better off by the Uruguay Round, this 
overall gain obscured the fact that some regions actually experienced a net 
loss. The 48 least developed countries lost 600 million UDS as China 
captured most of the gains (Gallagher 2008:73). Moreover, the UR also 
implied a loss of sovereignty of development policies, which Gallagher 
argues was an important reason for resistance to the DDR. The benefits of 
potential scenarios of a DDR agreement has also been questioned. In the 
”likely” scenario, benefits for all developing countries would actually only 
be 22 billion USD. The World Bank has estimated that this would lift 6,2 
million people from poverty and 2,5 million people from extreme poverty 
(out of a total number of approximately 3 billion and 1,2 billion, 
respectively) (see Gallagher 2008:80). Of course, these are not insignificant 
numbers but when the benefits are divided between many countries it might 
be hard to discern large improvements on the aggregated level. Gallagher 
identifies this as a prime reason for why India and other developing 
countries were reluctant to accept the deal on the table – it was too hard 
                                                                                                                                         
 
8 Particularly, Krugman argues that the winners of free trade should compensate the losers. See Columbia 
University webpage: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/media/06/429_copingGlobal/ 
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politically to bring home as the benefits were not large enough to yield 
sufficient political support9.  
At the same time, developed countries subsidies is often blamed for 
depressing world prices and knocking out farmers in developing countries 
as a whole (although perhaps not in developing countries that are net 
importers of farm products, see Charlton & Stiglitz 2006:69). The U.S’ 
agricultural subsidies have recently amounted to around 8 billion USD a 
year (Blustein 2008).  
3.2 Level I: Indian diplomatic negotiations 
As mentioned before (see 1.1.1), the underlying idea of the of the Geneva 
2008 Ministerial was to cut trade barriers and farm subsidies (Blustein 
2008). Deputies of ministers had pre-negotiated for months and american 
negotiators had made sure it was understood that the U.S. would never be as 
eager to close a deal again (Berridge 2005:29ff) (Blustein 2008). The U.S. 
had offered to cap farm subsidies at 15 billion USD a year, an initiative that 
had been deemed not good enough since actual spending recently have 
amounted to 8 billion USD a year. At the same time though, the U.S. had 
conceded the need of SSM for developing countries, the issue was rather at 
what level it be set (Berridge 2005:46f). Expectations about a successful 
outcome were moderate10 (Spero & Hart 2006:115). On the 25th of July, as 
negotiatons were underway, Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry and 
chief negotiator Shri Kamal Nath issued the following statement:  
”As far as developing country agriculture is concerned, the challenges are well 
known. Most of Indian agriculture is subsistence level agriculture. For us, 
                                                                                                                                         
 
9 In the ”complete” liberalization scenario, 66 million people would be lifted from poverty. 
However, if migration liberalization were to be included in the agreement (in the form of allowing 
for more visas for professional employees and low-skilled workers as proposed by developing 
countries), it would render the benefits of all other scenarios small in comparison. Gain estimates 
amount to 150-300 billion USD annually (compared to 22 billion USD in the ”likely” scenario) 
(Gallagher 2008:80).  
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agriculture involves the livelihoods of the poorest farmers who number in the 
hundreds of millions. We cannot have a development Round without an 
outcome which provides full comfort to livelihood and food security concerns 
in developing countries. There has been some progress in discussions on SPs 
and SSM but important gaps still remain. The poor of the world will not 
forgive us if we compromise on these concerns. These concerns are too vital 
to be the subject of trade-offs. A successful outcome will require a full 
addressal of these concerns. 
We are not at all happy about the SSM proposal. All manner of objections are 
being raised to our right to safeguard livelihood concerns of hundreds of 
millions. Are we expected to standby, see a surge in imports and do nothing? 
Do we give developed countries the unfettered right to continue subsidizing & 
then dumping those subsidies on us jeopardizing lives of billions? The 
position of developed counties is utterly self-righteous: they have enjoyed 
their SSG11 (and want to continue it) but our SSM must be subject to all sorts 
of shackles and restraints. This self-righteousness will not do. If it means no 
deal, so be it” (Taken from a statement by Kamal Nath, published on the 
Indian government website the 25th of July 200812).  
As negotiations went on and seemed to reach a deadlock, WTO Director-
General Pascal Lamy worked out a proposal himself for the parties to accept 
or decline. According to events that has since transpired, he gathered 
negotiators, only to have Kamal Nath reject everything in the proposal: 
”I cannot put the livelihood of hundreds of millions of people at risk” 
”If the [Indian] government wants this, they’ll have to find a new minister” 
(Blustein 2008).  
According to Blustein, the chief ire for Nath was apparently that in Lamy’s 
proposal, the SSM trigger rate was 140 per cent of normal imports, 
something the U.S. had allegedly insisted upon. Nath argued that the SSM 
                                                                                                                                         
 
10 The Guardian webpage: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/jul/21/doha.trade 
11 SSG: The Special Agricultural Safeguard, negotiated during the Uruguay Round (WTO website: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/guide_agric_safeg_e.htm) 
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couldn’t be implemented properly, because India’s ability to monitor its 
imports of individual products was so low that by the time the government 
would detect a 40 per cent import surge, farmers would already be 
committing suicide en masse (Blustein 2008). In Blusteins interpretation, 
Nath feared political repercussions at home for agreeing to something which 
corresponded to Indian concessions and that could be protrayed and 
perceived as a sellout of the farmers. So he did not divert from his hardline 
position on the SSM issue. Thus, despite Lamy’s attempt to work out a deal, 
the Conference ended without an agreement, although this was not entirely 
down to the SSM issue (see Blustein 2008)13.  
3.3 Level II: Domestic politics in India 
The two-level game framework underlines two win-set determinants that 
concern Level II and that will be included in this overview: Level II 
preferences and coalitions and Level II institutions (Level 1 negotiators 
strategies, already dealt with).  
Since India has a lot of arable land and cheap labour, they should have a 
comparative advantage in many farm products. Economists have confirmed 
this (see Gulati et al 1994). Logically, their farm sector should then be 
advocating a liberal trade policy (Rogowski 2000:318f), but we now know 
that the country’s position in Geneva 2008 was defensive. In this section I 
will present empirical indications that the socio-economic reality and 
institutional reforms in India has influenced the domestic political restraints 
                                                                                                                                         
 
12 India’s Department of Commerce webpage: 
http://commerce.nic.in/pressrelease/pressrelease_detail.asp?id=2290 
13 In the aftermath, USA chief negotiator Susan Schwab mentioned that it was unacceptable with a SSM 
trigger level that allowed developing countries to raise their tariffs to pre-Doha levels, while mentioning 
that ”one” country didn’t show flexibility (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/31/wto.india). 
India, on the other hand, blamed the U.S. (see 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/twninfo20080754.htm) 
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that are put on the government, leading to its protectionist position on the 
SSM issue at the 2008 WTO Ministerial in Geneva.  
Below, empirical examples of direct political influence exerted on the 
government are included. When choosing what aspects of the domestic 
politics to include in the survey, it is important to argue why some aspects 
should be given special attention at the cost of others. In India, trade 
agreements are not subject to parliamentary ratification (see Gupta 
2006:10). This fact makes an analysis of, for example, parliamentary 
interpellations, redundant. Instead I have choosen to focus on the general 
situation in India with respect to the farmers there. Surupa Gupta argues that 
Indian trade policy has been shaped by three domestic features in India: the 
agricultural policies, the socio-political restraints and the institutions 
through which the trade policies are made (Gupta 2006:2).  
3.3.1 The agricultural policies and socio-political restraints 
Back in the 1960’s a food shortage led to a domestic agriculture policy 
that ever since has been insufficient (Gupta 2006:19) (Ray & Saha 
2008:1ff). The levels of investment in agriculture and public infrastructure 
are not enough and the legal framework regulating the agricultural sector is 
outdated (see Gupta 2006:20) (Krugman & Obstfeld 2000:263). India is the 
third largest food producer in the world and 700-840 million people of its 
population are dependent on rural agriculture that is largely small-scale 
(Gupta 2008:2) (Ray & Saha 2008:4). Due to their precarious situation, 
there is a high prevalence of suicides among Indian farmers. Estimates of 
the number of farmer suicides for the period 2001-2007 ranges between 
5.000 to more than 10.000 (Aggarwal 2008:1) and this is contuing at an 
alarming rate14. 
                                                                                                                                         
 
14 See newspaper articles: http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/1500-farmers-commit-
mass-suicide-in-india-14268995.html and http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-
1082559/The-GM-genocide-Thousands-Indian-farmers-committing-suicide-using-genetically-modified-
crops.html 
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Such socio-economical features in a democracy like India are bound to 
have some political repercussions on the civil society. Swadeshi Jagaran 
Manch is a political movement that advocates economical self-reliance in 
India15, with over 15 other organizations associated to it. The philosophical 
idea about economic self-reliance can actually be traced back to Mahatma 
Gandhi. The spiritual leader of Indian independence movement, Gandhi 
championed Indian manufactures ahead of imported ones (Copley 1993:50). 
More specifically, Swadeshi (meaning self-sufficiency in Hindi) Jagaran 
Manch demands:  
 
Agriculture is not only a source of livelihood for millions of Indian farmers but also a 
way of life, and therefore it cannot be allowed to be left at whims of the market and subject 
to international trade agreements. Therefore agriculture should be kept out of WTO 
negotiations. Under the circumstances when developed world has failed to keep their 
commitments to reduce agricultural subsidies, government of India should not allow 
negotiations to go on at WTO. Given the fact that the government no longer enjoys 
majority support in the parliament, it should refrain from the making any new and 
important commitment at international forums, especially when it amounts to 
compromising the interests of farmers, industries, fishermen and country at large (Taken 
from Swadeshi Jagaran Manch website)16. 
 
Representants from Swadeshi Jagaran Manch were also present at the 
conference WTO Negotiations: Protecting Livelihoods and Ensuring Food 
Security, organised by the Forum for Biotechnology and Food Security and 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 
New Delhi in June 200817. There, around 30 farmers’ leaders from all over 
the country met to discuss India’s agricultural trade policy. This resolution 
was later submitted to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA, the ruling coalition of parties) chairperson 
Sonia Gandhi and the leader of the opposition Lal Krishna Advani, ahead of 
                                                                                                                                         
 
15 http://www.swadeshi.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16&Itemid=57 
16 http://www.swadeshi.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=534&Itemid=132 
17 http://news.oneindia.in/2008/06/11/farmers-leaders-want-india-to-reject-drafts-come-out-of-wto-
1213200217.html. The farm organisations also organised forums in states like Madhya Pradesh, Tamil 
Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka to spread awareness about the WTO deal and its impact on Indian 
agriculture and farmers.  
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the WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva the following month. It stated 
that India should come out of WTO and should not sacrifice the livelihood 
of 800 million people in the countryside:  
 
We, the representatives of farming community, fisher folks, agricultural 
workers, adivasis, dalits and rural women, civil society organizations, 
academia, resolve that the latest drafts on Agriculture and Non Agricultural 
Market Access (NAMA) are the final nails on the coffin of the country’s food 
security and sovereignty.  Both the drafts are an orchestrated attempt to open 
up the Indian markets for highly subsidized cheaper imports. Importing food 
is importing unemployment that will destroy livelihoods and the country’s 
food self-sufficiency. 
We, representing the majority India are highly concerned about the dilution of 
Government’s position in the WTO negotiations which will play havoc with 
the lives of us millions. What is being offered to us at WTO by way of special 
products (SP) and Special Safeguard Measures (SSM) is only a smokescreen 
and offers no real protection to Indian agriculture, fisheries and forestry.  We 
do not see any efforts by rich countries to remove their agriculture subsidies 
that depress global prices and insulate their transnational corporations against 
any market volatility. 
In this context and given the above concerns, we demand that the Government 
should reject the two drafts, as they fail to take India’s minimum concerns on-
board. Since this has implications on millions of lives and livelihoods of our 
people, the government should restore import duties to the bound levels and 
bring back quantitative restrictions18. Given the global food crisis, and the 
extent of agrarian distress in the country, the SP’s and SSM’s are inadequate 
to protect livelihoods and food security. 
This entire process of negotiations ending up in such one sided deals is a 
wasted and futile exercise. It is high time the Indian government stands up for 
its people otherwise the socio, economic and political consequences will be 
disastrous. Hence, Agriculture should be left out of WTO. (Resolution from 
the Forum for Biotechnology and Food Security & UNCTAD India, June 11th 
200819. See Appendix for signatories).  
 
                                                                                                                                         
 
18 An older form of trade barrier, limiting the number of imported products rather than imposing a fee on 
each imported item.  
19 http://www.viacampesina.org/main_en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=570&Itemid=1 
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This resolution is an example of the strong agricultural and protectonist 
lobbyism in India, whose existence and activities are confirmed by Ray & 
Saha (2008:12). It actually dismisses the SSM and calls for a total exclusion 
of agriculture of the WTO agenda altogether, as well as mentioning the 
drafts on NAMA20, whose scope is beyond the SSM. Still it must be 
considered protectionist and an agricultural deal with SSM must surely have 
been preferable to an agriculture deal without SSM.  
From a constructivist perspective it can be added that, according to 
several analysts, the dominant discourse on the WTO in India signalled a 
disenchantment with  the WTO and its agenda (Gupta 2006:21ff). Ray & 
Saha argues that it was EU and U.S. stubbornness in not making enough 
concessions on their agricultural subsidies program that prompted Indian 
hardline in the DDR right from the start (Ray & Saha 2008:3).  
3.3.2 Domestic political institutions 
The political landscape in India can briefly be understood as follows: 
The party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) lost the 2004 elections partly 
through a misguided campaign called India Shining, that unsuccessfully 
tried to appeal to a feeling of economic well-being and optimism after the 
success of the IT-boom (Gupta 2004:20). The party Indian National 
Congress (INC) had, based on their win, a different political discourse that 
voters found as a more accurate description of the real situation in the 
country. According to Blustein, then to-be Commerce and Industry Minister 
Kamal Nath was instrumental in his party’s tranformation in directing its 
appeal to the nations’ vast rural population (Blustein 2008)21.  
The Indian government is headed by a prime minister and are 
responsible to the parliament, while a rather weak president oversees the 
whole structure (Shively 2005:325). In other words India has a 
parliamentary system (with certain aspects borrowed from the presidential 
                                                                                                                                         
 
20 WTO webpage: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/nama_10july08_e.htm 
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system). Normally, this means that the government is dependent on 
parliamentary approval. But as pointed out above, the Indian executive 
enjoys insulation from paliament influence when it comes to trade policy. 
Nevertheless, they still have to relate to the legislative’s preferences and 
coalitions to a certain degree if they seek reelection. According to Gupta, 90 
per cent of Indian parliament members elected in the 2004 elections came 
from rural areas, leaving them accountable to the farmers there (Gupta 
2004:11)22.  
Another institutional factor is the administration reform that led to a new 
consultative policymaking process in Indian public administration, initiated in the 
late 90’s. The primary obejctive was to increase the legitimacy through greater 
inclusion of opinions and as such to the ideal of participatory democracy (Gupta 
2006:22ff). Traditionally, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, its Department 
of Commerce (DoC) and especially Trade Policy Division (TPD) was charged 
with WTO negotiations. After the reforms, the Department of Agriculture and 
Cooperation (DoAC) became much more involved in the policymaking process, 
after having been virtually left out during the Uruguay Round (Gupta 2006:24). 
According to Gupta (Ibíd), the DoAC’s primary interest is protecting the interests 
of the famers and it held various conferences with interest groups linked to this 
constituency, leading to these interest gropus being internalized in the 
policymaking process (see Gupta 2006:40).  
Representatives from Indian states were also consulted: India being a 
federation, its states are responsible for agriculture while the federal level is in 
charge of trade policy. During the Uruguay Round, the central government 
negotiated agriculture without consulting the states. This was something that 
didn´t fall down well as, suffice to say,  several states unsuccessfully tried to sue 
the central government. After the reforms, the new consultative process was put 
in practice in 2000 in the run-up to the the start of the DDR. The DoAC invited 
farmer’s organizations, other NGO:s and state governments to participate in 
                                                                                                                                         
 
21 This political positioning to appeal to Indian farmers can be derived from Rational Choice theory and 
the ”catch-all” party (see Downs 1957) (see Erlingsson et al. 2005).  
22 Even though the parliament hold no veto over trade agreements, India has a paliamentary system where 
the prime minister is accountable to his supporting parties and in turn, the people. These two observations 
can also be derived from Rational Choice theory (Downs 1957).   
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regional meetings with the DoAC and the DoC, in which special concerns 
regarding problems facing the countryside were voiced (Gupta 2006:20ff). 
Liberal lobbyism was largely absent although economists voiced their opinions 
that more concessions should be demanded from the EU (Ibíd). From now on, 
draft proposals on agricuture and trade policy were jointly formulated by the 
DoAC and the DoC (Gupta 2006:26), the conclusion being that Indian agriculture 
(due to being inefficient and small scale)  was not yet internationally competetive 
and would not be so for some time yet (Gupta 2006:13). This made Indian trade 
policy in agriculture to centre around the principle of Food Security, which 
according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations ”exists 
when all people, at all times, have access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to 
meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life23”. 
However, the Indian government chose to define it as the strive that ”agriculture 
remains a viable source of livelihood to the large percentage of population 
dependent on it”24 (see also Gupta 2004:4).  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 
23 Fod and Agriculture Organization webpage: http://www.fao.org/spfs/en/ 
24 Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Ministry of Agriculture, “WTO Agreement on Agriculture:  
India’s Proposals, http://pib.nic.in/focus/foyr2001/foapr2001/aoa1.html#4 
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4 Analysis 
 
In this chapter, I use the two-level game framework to analyse the 
empirical background, arguing that the domestic politics in India restrained 
the win-set of chief negotiator Shri Kamal Nath and made it irreconcilable 
with the U.S. win-set (see 3.1). It is important to keep in mind that I am not 
trying to prove that it was exclusively the circumstances and examples 
presented here that prompted the position of the Indian government. I am 
merely pointing at examples and indications of a problable connection, in 
line with Robert Putnams’ theoretical framework, a connection that of 
course was influenced by other things as well.  
4.1 Overall picture 
It is already clear that Indian and U.S. win-sets did not overlap on the 
SSM issue. Applying the one-issue Figure 1 from chapter 3: 
 
 
 
 
                 India   India1                           USA1                    USA                    
 
 
Graphically, we see that neither India nor USA were willing to make further 
concessions; India wanted the SSM trigger level set low and U.S. wanted it 
set high (140% according to Blustein 2008). Both countries had rather 
narrow win-sets which made an agreement less likely. In relative terms, 
both negotiators were faced with equivalent domestic restraints, unabling 
neither to ”push the other one around” much (Putnam 1988:440). Susan 
Schwab, the U.S. chief negotiator, was faced with pressure from american 
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exporters (with ties to Congress) who sought new export markets and could 
therefore not accept a low SSM trigger rate. U.S. government was also faced 
with lobbying to not reduce U.S. agricultural subsidies too much (Blustein 
2008). In other words, noone could take advantage of the diplomatic asset of 
having a relatively more narrow win-set than the other. There was no room 
for compromise nor was neither party able to convince the other one to 
change its win-set. A first tentative answer to the question of investigation 
can therefore be that India’s win-set was too narrow to allow for an 
agreement. Why, then, was India’s win-set so narrow? Recalling chapter 3, 
the size of the win-set was determined by three factors: Level II preferences 
and coalitions, Level II institutions and Level I negotiators’ strategies. 
4.2 Indian preferences and coalitions 
The hundreds of millions of farmers and people dependent on domestic 
agriculture in India were in chapter 3 stressed as a major determinant in 
Indian politics. Especially, the many suicides among farmers (that has also 
been given some media attention in recent years) indicate the level of 
poverty and vulnerability that they live. Such demographic features are 
bound to have a significant political impact in a democracy like India. Also, 
the low levels of investment and the old legal framework have made sure 
that even though studies have shown potential for comparative advantage in 
many products, Indian agriculture is underdeveloped and small-scale.  
Moreover, Indian protectionism can be deduced back to resistance to 
British colonial rule and Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophical ideas. With it’s 
many subsistent famers and historical protectionism, India isn’t too 
dependent on international trade, which is perhaps why liberal lobbysim 
was largely absent. Swadesi Jagaran Manch’s political agenda presented in 
chapter 3 serve as an example of the high level of protectionist sentiments 
that still exist in today’s Indian domestic politics:  
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”Agriculture is not only a source of livelihood for millions of Indian farmers 
but also a way of life, and therefore it cannot be allowed to be left at whims of 
the market and subject to international trade agreements”.  
 
”Under the circumstances when developed world has failed to keep their 
commitments to reduce agricultural subsidies, government of India should not 
allow negotiations to go on at WTO”. (Taken from Swadeshi Jagaran Manch 
website)25. 
 
Evident in these extracts, there exists a great deal of suspiciousness 
towards free trade. Interdependence in the form of international trade is seen 
as something bad, rather than as an opportunity to increase economic 
growth and reduce poverty.  
The same goes for the resolution agreed to and signed by a coaliton of 
farmers’ organizations, which represent a largre part of the Indian 
electorate. Relating to the two-level game framework, this resolution 
corresponds very well to Level II restraints put on Level I, since it was sent 
to the government. As Putnam points out, what interest groups do is 
mobilize for or against certain policies, forcing the incumbent government 
and opposition to consider public opinion if they want to be elected (Putnam 
1988:432 and 436): 
 
”Importing food is importing unemployment that will destroy livelihoods and 
the country’s food self-sufficiency”. 
 
”We, representing the majority India are highly concerned about the dilution 
of Government’s position in the WTO negotiations which will play havoc 
with the lives of us millions”. 
 
”We do not see any efforts by rich countries to remove their agriculture 
subsidies that depress global prices and insulate their transnational 
corporations against any market volatility”. (Resolution from the Forum for 
Biotechnology and Food Security & UNCTAD India, June 11th 200826. See 
Appendix for signatories).  
                                                                                                                                         
 
25 http://www.swadeshi.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=534&Itemid=132 
26 http://www.viacampesina.org/main_en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=570&Itemid=1 
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Since the resolution asked for the total elimination of agriculture 
negotiations in the WTO, Indian government found itself in the crossfire 
between the domestic and international pressure (after all, it had committed 
itself to the WTO agenda by being a member country). A compromise was 
to keep negotiating agricultural issues in the WTO but to remain adamant 
on the SSM issue. The protectionist position of India in WTO has also been 
sustained by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), which is the ruling 
coalition of parties heading the government in India after the 2004 elections. 
As economic theory tells us (see Krugman & Obstfeld 2008), normally 
international trade isn’t a zero-sum game. Nevertheless, since developed 
countries’ competetiveness is sustained by massive subsidies, something 
which deviates from the idea of free trade and distorts actual trade patterns 
(Krugman & Obstfeld 2008:283), there is still a legitimate reason for Indian 
suspiciousness about the effects of a DDR agreement. The extracts above 
mention the agricultural subsidies, which shows that Indian free trade and 
liberalization aversion is linked to their existence. As India started 
formulating their trade policy in the build-up to the DDR in 2000, 
protectionism was on the rise on the global scene after the riots in Seattle 
1999. The politization of free trade, evident in such mass protests, is a 
particularly pressing issue in India given the farmers suicides there. It made 
the government realise that a sequencing of liberalization reforms was the 
best option27. In economic theory, this can be categorized under the so 
called Infant Industry Argument, according to which initial tariff protection 
is justifiable (until competetiveness has been reached) because of the high 
fixed costs associated with starting up a business in certain sectors and the 
advantages of foreign firms. This prevents the developing country from 
entering the market and realizing its potential comparative advantage. 
However, after competetiveness has been reached, tariff removal is 
sometimes still resisted (see Coughlin, Chrystal & Wood 2000:312f).  
                                                                                                                                         
 
27 This suggests that India viewed the SSM as both a mean to protect farmers, but also to help long-term 
liberalization (see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/guide_agric_safeg_e.htm).   
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4.3 Indian institutions 
When it comes to the second determinant of the win-set size, Putnam 
mentions parliamentary ratification procedures as an example of domestic 
institutions (1988:448). Since Indian government enjoys insulation from the 
parliament on trade policy, as pointed out in chapter 3, it was necessary to 
look elsewhere to find other institutional factors relevant to the theory.  
The new policymaking process, in which the Department of Agriculture 
and Cooperation (DoAC) became more involved and had a bigger say in 
trade policy formulation, meant that more emphasis was put on the situation 
of the farmers. The DoAC’s had a mandate to protect the farmers’ interests 
and the analysis of the new policymaking process rests on the understanding 
of the Indian executive as a multifaceted actor, rather than as a unitary one, 
something also pointed out by Gupta (2006:11). The Indian government’ 
definition of Food Security, which said that agriculture should be an income 
for people in India, implies that the domestic agriculture must be protected 
from foreign competition. 
Through its meetings with civil society and farmers’s organizations, the 
DoAC channelled farm sector input (such as the one mentioned in 4.1) 
through the bureaucracy and was thus able to influence the trade policy. In 
other words, the civil society lobbyism analysed in 4.1 was combined with 
an institutional reform that facilitated the penetration of protectionist 
policies. Also, during the Geneva 2008 negotiations, Indian chief negotiator 
Nath was accompanied by ministers from the DoAC28. Their mere presence 
also suggests that the influence of the DoAC had increased. 
State level governments also became increasingly involved in the 
policymaking process, which to a certain extent can be seen as an  increased 
decentralization of Indian democracy. Resentment was high in many Indian 
states after being left out during the Uruguay Round, which the attempts to 
sue the central government indicate. By delegating responsibility and 
                                                                                                                                         
 
28 See http://www.merinews.com/catFull.jsp?articleID=137673 
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empowering the states, India’s trade policy probably gained more 
legitimacy, at least from the outside. Somewhat paradoxically, it could 
therefore actually be argued that the increased red tape which was the 
implication of the reform, actually meant a more democratic and 
representative policymaking process, at least from a participatory 
perspective29.  
The 2004 general elections, which saw the Indian National Congress 
(INC) and more leftist delegates coming to power, also has to be taken into 
account in the light of the fact that India has a parliamentary system where 
the government is subjected to parliamentary approval. The BJP party’s 
political campaign of Shining India and its projection of economic 
optmimism and well-being was rejected as a description of the reality by the 
electorate. Instead focus turned on the precarious situation of the farmers. 
The INC’s repeated win in 2009 also indicates that the people are happy 
with the country’s policies in the WTO and the refusal to accept the deal in 
Geneva 2008. According to Gupta, 90% of parliamentary delegates elected 
in 2004 came from the countryside. Facing the risk of losing the next 
elections, they were accountable to this constituency where  protectionism 
in agricultural import tariffs should be most present. The parliamentary 
system of India was probably not a prime reason for the government to 
reject the proposed deal by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy. This is so 
because the government could act without parliament consent in Geneva, 
but also because it is hard to find any direct evidence that can point to 
pressure from the UPA to let the negotiations break down. Instead, pressure 
came first and foremost from various lobbyist groups, such as the coalition 
of farmer’s associations mentioned above. However, the party politics of 
India should not be totally overseen. An agreement in Geneva could have 
stirred uprise among the rural population in India which could easily have 
been exploited by the opposition or even memebr parties of the UPA who 
                                                                                                                                         
 
29 Although while participatory democracy probably increases the democratic legitimacy for the one’s 
who can participate in politics, it is still inherently exclusive since everyone does not have that 
opportunity. Therefore, on the aggregated level, democratic legitimacy comes from representative 
democracy and its elections since everyone has a vote.  
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sought to gain public support. This would have weakened the government 
and its capacity to pass future legislation, while at the same time hurting its 
credibility as the party that cared for the farmers and chance with it, its 
chances to be reelected.  
4.4 Indian negotiators’ strategies 
Neiter should chief negotiator Kamal Nath’s strong personal ties to 
Indian farmers be left out as a possible explanation for his strategy in 
Geneva 2008. Apparently, Nath was by then a rather popular man i India, 
especially among the rural population (Blustein 2008). After having 
directed his party to appeal to India’s rural masses and being subjected to 
protectionist pressure from interest groups representing precisely this 
constituency, it is obvious that Nath’s hands were tied in the negotiations. 
Nath’s political rationality is in his discourses and actions evident. 
However, as we shall see next it wasn’t necessarily something that didn’t 
coincide with his personal convictions.  
Evident in his political discourse and actions, India had a win-set that 
simply didn’t allow for a higher import rate to trigger the SSM. At the same 
time, it gave Kamal Nath a stronger bargaining position since the other 
countries had a harder time trying to convince him to change his position. 
Moreover, the below statements by Nath suggests that possibly his personal 
convictions might have played a part in the decision-making (see Putnam 
1988:457):  
”I (emphasis added) cannot put the livelihood of hundreds of millions of 
people at risk” 
”If the [Indian] government wants this, they’ll have to find a new minister” 
(Blustein 2008).  
Not too much should be read into these words, but an-out-of context 
analysis of the latter formulation almost seems to suggest that the rest of the 
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government had instructed Nath to agree to a deal, or at least that the 
instructions were vague and opened for an ad-hoc approach. Also, he didn’t 
make any substantial efforts to expand his own win-set.  
Given their recurrence and central place in his discourse, two things can 
be identified as the most important elements; (1) the allusion to the 
precarious situation of the farmers and their need for livelihood security and 
(2) the accusations against the developed countries over their agricultural 
subsidies. When Nath explains that the socio-economic situation of the 
farmers simply made a compromise on the SSM issue impossible, he’s 
using his Level II restraints as a bargaining advantage, as predicted by 
Putnam (1988:440).  
 
”For us, agriculture involves the livelihoods of the poorest farmers who 
number in the hundreds of millions. We cannot have a development Round 
without an outcome which provides full comfort to livelihood and food 
security concerns in developing countries”. 
”There has been some progress in discussions on SPs and SSM but important 
gaps still remain. The poor of the world will not forgive us if we compromise 
on these concerns. These concerns are too vital to be the subject of trade-offs. 
A successful outcome will require a full addressal of these concerns”. 
The accusations against the developed countries over their agricultural 
subsidies with the objective to get them reduced, which is the second 
important element of Nath’s discourse, can be regarded as an attempt of 
reverberation (international pressure to expand a country’s win-set to 
facilitate agreement, see Putnam 1988:456). In other words, just as 
predicted by Putnam, Indian chief negotiator Nath related to Level II 
restraints both at home and abroad. When he criticises developed countries 
agricultural subsidies, he is obviously trying to maximize their win-sets 
(Putnam 1988:450). At the same time, it is also an attempt to change their 
perceptions of the developing countries’ benefits of the deal (restructuring, 
see Putnam 1988:454): 
 
”We are not at all happy about the SSM proposal. All manner of objections 
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are being raised to our right to safeguard livelihood concerns of hundreds of 
millions. Are we expected to standby, see a surge in imports and do nothing? 
Do we give developed countries the unfettered right to continue subsidizing & 
then dumping those subsidies on us jeopardizing lives of billions?”.   
Besides mentioning the agricultural subsidies, the next and last extract 
from Nath’s official  statements during the negotiations is a clear indication 
that his win-set is ”kinky”. When he says ”If it means no deal, so be it” he 
indicates that he has exhausted possibilities to make concessions. At the 
same time, it is a statement that signals resolve and a low cost of ”no-
agreement”. It is also an indication that Nath had little concern for the risk 
of involuntary defection from the U.S. (had Susan Schwab, the american 
chief negotiator, been willing to agree to his demands) and uncertainty 
therefore didn’t play an important part in Nath’s calculations since it didn’t 
lead him to pull back on his demands in order to ensure U.S. ratification:  
 
”The position of developed counties is utterly self-righteous: they have 
enjoyed their SSG (and want to continue it) but our SSM must be subject to 
all sorts of shackles and restraints. This self-righteousness will not do. If it 
means no deal, so be it” (Taken from a statement by Kamal Nath, published 
on the Indian government website30 on the 25th of July 2008).  
U.S.’ agricultural subsidies and Kamal Nath’s ties to Indian farmers 
made India’s position collide with that of the U.S. This casts light on the 
locked situation: in order to endorse a reduction of U.S. farm subsidies, 
interest groups in the U.S. have to be placated by new export markets that 
the lowering of Indian import tariffs would mean. At the same time, 
statements from both Level I and Level II in India (see chapter 3) have 
shown that one of the biggest underlying reasons for Indian persistence on 
the SSM position is developed countries’ farm subsidies. If tariffs are to be 
lowered, subsidies have to be significantly reduced or fears are they would 
lead to import surges in India, hurting the farmers there. No country wants 
                                                                                                                                         
 
30 Indian government webpage: http://commerce.nic.in/pressrelease/pressrelease_detail.asp?id=2290 
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to be the first in making the concessions and risk loosing its capacity to 
horse-trade.  
To resume, insufficient domestic agricultural policies has led to 
underdeveloped and small scale farming in India, exacerbating the situation 
of the farmers which was the prime reason for the Indian position on the 
SSM. The agricultural subsidies of the developed countries was another 
important reason. The reform of the policymaking process at the executive 
level meant that these concerns could be voiced and influence the trade 
policy. Kamal Nath’s domestic entanglements and undertaking with Indian 
farmers made India’s position further collide with that of the U.S.  
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5 Conclusions and final reflections 
The question of investigation was: Why could the Indian government not agree 
with the USA on the Special Safeguard Mechanism issue at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Geneva in July 2008?  
 
It has been shown that protectionism in Indian domestic politics, which is 
spurred by the widespread, deep poverty and high suicide rate among Indian 
farmers and the fear that increased imports would exacerbate the situation, 
had a decisive impact on the country’s trade policy in Geneva 2008. Indian 
protectionism and the idea of self-sufficiency has historical roots and its 
domestic agricultural policies of regulations had left the farm sector 
underdeveloped and small-scale, unable to realize its potential comparative 
advantage on the world market. All this had created a situation were the 
WTO and the free trade agenda was viewed with suspiciousness, as is 
evident in the example of Swadeshi Jagaran Manch and the farmers’ 
organizations who exerted protectionist pressure on the Indian government 
prior to the Minsterial Conference. This is one probable reason for the chief 
negotiator’s narrow win-set there. Also, the states and several ministries had 
been left out of the policymaking process during the Uruguay Round. In a 
time when protectionism was on the rise and a bureaucratic reform 
empowered the states and the rural population, Indian government opted for 
a trade policy which focused on a protectionist understanding of Food 
Security, from which their position on the SSM issue can be derived. In the 
2004 general elections the Indian electorate elected the Indian National 
Congress party which had positioned itself as the party of the farmers.  
During the negotiations, Kamal Nath showed that he cared about the 
Indian farmers and was determined not to agree to something that he 
thought could compromise their livelihood security or that could be framed 
as a sellout of them. Some statements suggests that his personal opinion and 
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entanglements might have played a part, but a more significant factor was 
the lobbyism from various interest groups, already mentioned. Moreover, 
Nath’s statements indicated that India had a low cost of ”no-agreement”. 
This can be related to the somewhat modest results that a Doha agreement 
would have yielded, according to economic studies31.  
 
Thus, the hypothesis of this study, that the situation and influence of 
Indian farmers was an important reason for the fact that Indian and U.S. 
couldn’t agree, is confirmed. As mentioned previously, India has been 
blamed for the failure in Geneva 2008 (Spero & Hart 2008:283) (Economist 
2008). However, such analysis disregard of the underlying reasons for 
India’s position on the SSM. Nath’s statements during the negotiations 
reveal that the agricultural subsidies of the developed countries was a 
considerable such reason, which he used as a major argument to justify his 
own protectionist position. Without it, it would have been harder to sustain 
his position on the SSM. By focusing on India, I have highlighted yet 
another reason for developed countries to reduce their redundant and 
detrimental agricultural subsidies: it would facilitate future multilateral free 
trade agreements. After the U.S. had made its initial offer of a modest 
reduction of its subsidies that wouldn’t affect its current spending, talks 
began to centre around the SSM issue and stalled. By now, concessions by 
India would have implied a loss for them and vice versa. In other words, 
negotiations appeared competetive and a zero-sum game. In order to make 
the negotiations appear cooperative, it is necessary to expand them into a 
multi-issue negotiation. It would therefore have been better to keep 
negotiating both subsidies and the SSM at the same time: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 
31 However, I’m not arguing it was solely the factors presented in this study that influenced Indian trade 
policy. But, the presented evidence are credible examples of the influence of domestic politics in India, 
without specificating their exact level of influence or disregarding other factors.  
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Figure 2: Synergistic issue linkage 
                    India 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     USA 
 
In this simulation of the two-issue negotiation of SSM and agricultural subsidies, USA 
(which can be seen to represent any developed country) agree to reduce its agricultural 
subsidies by a substantial percentage (represented by the shift outwards of its political 
indifference curves). Since this reduces the risk of an import surge in developing countries, 
India is spurred to agree to a higher trigger level of the SSM (represented by the shift 
outwards of its political indifference curves), which matches with U.S. demands as the 
deadlocked is untangled and convergence is reached. Negotiations are perceived as 
cooperative.  
 
Developed countries have to substantially reduce their agriultural subsidies 
in order to lure developing countries to reciprocate by cutting their import 
tariffs as a quid pro quo, rather than expecting the developing countries to 
take the first step32. Regardsless of whether this is considered reasonable, it 
is necessary to show greater understanding of India’s position and adress its 
concerns oover the livelihood security of its rural population, in order to 
make a future agreement politically possible. 
                                                                                                                                         
 
32 This could be combined with other measures such as foreign aid, agriculture reform and increased 
liberalization in migration to ensure that Indians are not adversely affected by the increased trade. Of 
course developed countries also face domestic restraints, but that falls outside the scope of this study.  
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7 Appendix 
7.1 Shri Kamal Nath’s statement in its totality 
 
I am happy to be back in Geneva and hope to go up the Mont Blanc. I hope the intensive 
negotiations among Ministers in the next few days will enable us to make significant 
progress so that we can complete the Round by the end of the year. 
The trust vote yesterday in India’s Parliament emphasised the importance of addressing 
divergences through dialogue and debate. Through such debates, Indian democracy 
emerges stronger. My Government now has a renewed mandate to deliver on development 
issues to the people of India. I trust the decisions that we arrive at in the WTO in the next 
few days will enable me to deliver on that mandate. 
The major issues which we need to resolve are well known. We are meeting in the rather 
grim context of a number of crises in various parts of the world, of which the global food 
crisis is perhaps the most serious. The WTO can help in addressing this issue by making 
serious progress in agricultural reforms in developed countries. A very substantial outcome 
in reducing trade distorting support will incentivise agriculture in developing countries and 
reduce the investment deficit in developing country agriculture. This is the major 
benchmark which will define whether we achieve a successful outcome in this meeting. In 
addition, we also need to tackle market access barriers in developed countries due to high 
tariffs and other restrictions. Issues such as tariff simplification, tariff capping etc. need 
priority attention. 
I have been told of the offer made by the US yesterday on domestic support. I hope it is 
only their opening gambit and not their bottom-line because US$15 billion really makes no 
impact on current applied levels in the United States. In addition, we have the issue of 
disciplines on which we need an ambitious outcome. On top of this, if conditions like the 
Peace Clause are attached, it becomes hugely problematic. But, nevertheless, I am looking 
forward to a discussion today in the Green Room to see where this matter is going. At this 
stage, I would only say that without an ambitious outcome on domestic support, it would be 
very difficult to get traction on other issues.  
As far as developing country agriculture is concerned, the challenges are well known. Most 
of Indian agriculture is subsistence level agriculture. For us, agriculture involves the 
livelihoods of the poorest farmers who number in the hundreds of millions. We cannot have 
a development Round without an outcome which provides full comfort to livelihood and 
food security concerns in developing countries. There has been some progress in 
discussions on SPs and SSM but important gaps still remain. The poor of the world will not 
forgive us if we compromise on these concerns. These concerns are too vital to be the 
subject of trade-offs. A successful outcome will require a full addressal of these concerns. 
We are not at all happy about the SSM proposal. All manner of objections are being raised 
to our right to safeguard livelihood concerns of hundreds of millions. Are we expected to 
standby, see a surge in imports and do nothing? Do we give developed countries the 
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unfettered right to continue subsidizing & then dumping those subsidies on us jeopardizing 
lives of billions? The position of developed counties is utterly self-righteous: they have 
enjoyed their SSG (and want to continue it) but our SSM must be subject to all sorts of 
shackles and restraints. This self-righteousness will not do. If it means no deal, so be it. 
Regarding NAMA, I am astonished at the position that some developed countries have been 
taking. I have heard it said ad nauseum that emerging economies like India have been 
holding back on providing market access in NAMA. Nothing could be farther from the 
truth. For the last several years, we have been consistently reducing our tariffs and today, 
our applied tariffs, especially on products exported by developed countries, are near 
developed country levels. Our imports increase by more than 30% every year. Last year, 
US exports into India expanded by 75%. Where is the question of India holding back? As 
far as the extent of binding our autonomous liberalisation is concerned, it depends on the 
balance that we achieve on the negotiations across the various areas, including in terms of 
para 24. I am obviously not here to hand around freebies without getting something in 
return. Let me also say that those who accuse us of not moving on market access, have not 
moved an inch since the Uruguay Round in reducing high tariffs or tariff peaks on exports 
of developing countries. 
On the issue of Coefficients, we need a serious discussion on how we can fulfill the 
mandate for LTFR in reduction commitments. The contribution that developed countries 
are being asked to make is too low to fulfill this part of the mandate. 
We have been asked to agree to a new anti-concentration provision. This is a new 
development and I am not quite sure why this issue is being raised at this time. We 
negotiated this provision intensively in July 2004 and as far as I am concerned, that was the 
end of the matter. There is really not much scope for more concessions by developing 
countries on this issue. 
Similarly, we do not see the logic of linking Sectorals with coefficients and flexibilities. 
Sectorals are a totally different issue as it has been clearly agreed that these will be taken up 
after the NAMA modalities are finalised. Moreover, it has been also agreed that 
participation in Sectorals will be voluntary. Linking these issues will further complicate our 
task of finalizing modalities. 
Regarding Services, India’s position is crystal clear. We have been quite liberal in making 
new commitments in our earlier offers. We have now informed our trading partners that we 
are willing to do significantly more. But, obviously, this depends on whether they are 
willing to reciprocate on the limited demands that we have. As far as the Signalling 
Conference is concerned, I have said it a number of times that I expect it to be a serious 
negotiating forum and not a cocktail party. We are here to do serious business. We expect 
our trading partners to come to the Conference with the same intent. 
The Rules issues are important pending business. I believe the Chair has recently 
acknowledged what everyone has known for a long time – that his proposals are deeply 
unbalanced. The issues involved are of very deep systemic concern to many countries 
including India. Anti-dumping rules have to be strengthened to provide sound under-
pinnings for market access provisions. The issue of S&D in Fisheries Subsidies is of very 
serious concern for us. We are not discussing trade and commerce here. We are talking 
about livelihoods of millions of poor fishermen in India. We cannot accept disciplines 
which threaten these livelihoods or circumscribe our right to assist such fishermen. We had 
asked for a revised text before the Ministerial Meeting. We were not alone in this. This call 
has not been heeded. This issue has to be discussed in the Ministerial Meeting leading to a 
clear decision as an integral part of the outcome. 
Recent developments on the TRIPS issues have vindicated our position. More than one 
hundred members have joined together to demand a Ministerial decision for negotiations 
under the Single Undertaking based on key parameters. This issue could have been handled 
with greater understanding earlier. In any case, when more than two-thirds of the members 
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have joined in a common cause, the WTO cannot remain in denial. Ministers will need to 
come to a clear conclusion on this issue in the next few days. I hope the new process you 
have announced today under the Chairmanship of Minister of State of Norway, will lead us 
to the decision. 
While our primary task in the next few days is to conclude modalities in Agriculture 
and NAMA, we must not forget that this is a development Round and that developing 
countries, especially the smaller ones, expect a down payment on the issues of the greatest 
concern to them. These include DFQF for LDCs, preference erosion, special provisions for 
small and vulnerable economies etc. In our deliberations, such issues deserve priority 
attention. (Published on the Indian government websitethe 25th of July 200833).  
 
7.2 Susan Schwab’s statement 
The following is an extract from a statement from Susan Schwab, the 
american chief negotiator, on the 29th of July 200834, before negotiations 
had broken down: 
  
 “Regrettably, our negotiations deadlocked on the scope of a safeguard mechanism to remedy  
surges in imported agricultural products.    
  
“Any safeguard mechanism must distinguish between the legitimate need to address exceptional  
situations involving sudden and extreme import surges and a mechanism that can be abused.  
  
“In the face of a global food price crisis, we simply could not agree to a result that would raise  
more barriers to world food trade.   
  
“Certain members sought increased flexibilities that would have allowed them to apply tariffs  
that, in some cases, would exceed their current WTO bindings.  This would have moved the  
global trading system backwards – exactly contrary to the purposes of a negotiation intended to  
expand trade and economic growth.    
“Throughout these negotiations, the United States has been strongly committed and willing to  
make the tough choices necessary to achieve an ambitious breakthrough.  Since the launch of the  
Round, we have worked tirelessly, traveling hundreds of thousands of miles, spending countless  
hours negotiating in good faith, all to sustain the Round and bring together a development  
outcome that would open new markets and create new trade flows.  
7.3 Forum for Biotechnology and Food Security 
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) in New Delhi, June 
2008 
                                                                                                                                         
 
33 http://commerce.nic.in/pressrelease/pressrelease_detail.asp?id=2290 
34 Webpage of the United States Mission to the United Nations in Geneva: http://www.us-
mission.ch/Press2008/July/0725GreenRoomSchwab.html 
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7.3.1 Signatories of the resolution 
1.          Mr. Mahendra Singh Tikait, Bharatiya Kisan Union, Baghpat, UP 
2.          Mr. Rakesh Tikait, Bharatiya Kisan Union, Baghpat, UP 
3.          Mr. Gurnam Singh, Pradhan, Bharatiya Kisan Union, Haryana 
4.          Mr. Yudhvir Singh, Indian Coordination Committee of Farmers’ Movement, New 
Delhi 
5.          Mr. K Chellamuthu, President, Tamizhaga Uzhavar Uzhaipalar Sangam, Tamil 
Nadu 
6.          Mr. P. Chennaiah, Andhra Pradesh Vyavasaya Viritidarulu Union, APVVU, AP 
7.          Mr. KS Puttannaiah, Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha, Karnataka 
8.          Mr. Malla Reddy, Andhra Pradesh Rythu Sangham, Andhra Pradesh 
9.          Mr. Suneet Chopra, Joint Secretary, All India Agricultural Workers Union 
10.     Dr. Sunilam, Madhya Pradesh Kisan Sangharsh Samiti, MP 
11.     Mr. Bhagirath Chaudhary, Bharatiya Kisan Sangh, Rajasthan 
12.     Mr. Basavaraj Ingin, Karnataka Pradesh Red Gram Growers Association, Karnataka 
13.     Mr. Vijay Nandkishore Jawandhia, Shetkari Sanghathana, Maharashtra 
14.     Mr. N. D. Koli, National Fishworkers' Forum 
15.     Mr. Ambrish Rai, Lok Sangh Morcha, Ahmedabad, Gujarat 
16.     Fr. Mathew Vadakemury, Indian Farmers’ Movement (INFARM), Kerala 
17.     Mr. Kanniyan, Thamizhaga Vivasayigal Sangam (Tamil Nadu Farmers’ Association) 
18.     Mr. Sukhdev Singh Kokrikalan, Bharatiya Kisan Union, Punjab 
19.     Ms. Pratibha Shinde, Adivasi leader, Gujarat 
20.     Ms. Sheelu Francis, Tamil Nadu Women’s Collective 
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21.     Mr. Ram Kumar, Dynamic Action Group, Lucknow 
22.     Mr. Umendra Dutt, Kheti Virasat Mission, Jaitu, District - Faridkot, Punjab 151202 
23.     Ms. Alka Awasthi, CECOEDECON, Rajasthan 
24.     Dr. Surjeet Singh, Institute for Development Studies, Rajasthan 
25.     Mr. Utkarsh Sinha, Centre for Contemporary Studies & Research, Uttar Pradesh 
26.     Mr. Sanjay Singh, Parmarth, U.P. 
27.     Dr. GV Ramanjaneyulu, Centre for Sustainable Agriculture, AP 
28.     Ms. S Usha, Thanal, Kerala 
29.     Ms. Sangita Sharma, Annadana, Karnataka 
30.     Mr. Sanket Thakur, Chhattisgarh Agricon, Chhatisgarh 
31.     Dr. Ranjit Singh Ghuman, Punjabi University, Patiala, Punjab 
32.     Mr. Benny Kuruvilla, Focus on the Global South, New Delhi 
33.     Dr. Aseem Shrivastava, New Delhi 
34.     Mr. Sudeep Chakravarti, Writer 
35.     Mr. Devinder Sharma & Bhaskar Goswami, Forum for Biotechnology & Food 
Security, New Delhi 
 
 
 
 
